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Abstract 
Effects of exposure to a severe weather disaster on perceived future vulnerability were assessed in college students, local 
residents contacted through random-digit dialing, and community residents of affected versus unaffected neighborhoods. 
Students and community residents reported being less vulnerable than their peers at 1 month, 6 months, and 1 year after the 
disaster. In Studies 1 and 2, absolute risk estimates were more optimistic with time, whereas comparative vulnerability was 
stable. Residents of affected neighborhoods (Study 3), surprisingly, reported less comparative vulnerability and lower “gut- 
level” numerical likelihood estimates at 6 months, but later their estimates resembled the unaffected residents. Likelihood 
estimates (10%-12%), however, exceeded the 1% risk calculated by storm experts, and gut-level versus statistical-level 
estimates were more optimistic. Although people believed they had approximately a 1-in-10 chance of injury from future 
tornadoes (i.e., an overestimate), they thought their risk was lower than peers. 
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Hannah Miller knew the Mulders (both killed by a F-5 
tornado), who lived a few doors east of her now-
destroyed home . . . Miller lives alone, but her son and 
daughter-in-law were visiting when the warning went out . . 
. He said, “Time to go in the basement.” Miller said, “I 
never go in the basement. He had a hard time getting me 
to.” 
—Excerpt from an interview taken just days after an F-5 
tornado struck and destroyed the town of Parkersburg, Iowa 
(Gazette, Wednesday, May 28, 2008, p. 1A) 
Unrealistic comparative optimism refers to the common 
tendency for people to think they are less at risk of threats, 
such as illness, injury, or disaster, than are their peers 
(Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Weinstein, 1980; 
Weinstein & Klein, 1995). This belief is considered 
“unrealistic” because every- one cannot be less vulnerable. 
There is evidence that cognitive and motivational 
mechanisms are sources of the bias 
Midwestern city, which had a tornado of F-2 force touch- 
down one evening causing significant injuries, 
displacement of residents, and millions of dollars in 
damage. 
Prior Studies 
Despite the attention paid to the psychology of stress and 
trauma (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Seary, Holman, & 
Silver, 2010) and to unrealistic optimism (e.g., Weinstein, 
1980), little is known about the trajectory of comparative 
vulnerability beliefs following a natural disaster. We found 
only five previous naturalistic studies. First, after the 
Chernobyl nuclear reaction accident, Dolinski, Gromski, 
and Zawisza (1987) surveyed a sample of Polish high school 
students who had not experienced consequences of the 
disaster. These students reported feeling more vulnerable than 
other classmates to radiation-induced illness in the following 
year. 
(Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Guenther & Alicke, 2010; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988). This article considers whether 
optimism persists even after a disaster happens close-by. 
Was Hannah Miller, who seemed unaffected by the deaths 
of her neighbors in an earlier tornado, an oddity? A 
second question is whether temporal or physical proximity 
to a natural disaster influences the trajectory of 
vulnerability beliefs. Three naturalistic field studies 
followed residents of a small 
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Second, Burger and Palmer (1992) surveyed college 
students, who resided near the Loma Prieta earthquake but 
had not been directly affected. Shortly after the disaster, the 
students were not optimistic about avoiding harm from 
earthquakes in the future; in fact, they felt more vulnerable 
than their peers. After 3 months, however, they reported 
feeling less vulnerable to an earthquake than their peers. 
Burger and Palmer concluded, “out of sight out of mind 
effect makes living in earthquake country easier” (p. 43). 
Third, Helweg-Larsen (1999) collected ratings of 
comparative invulnerability from a sample of students 
attending the University of California, Los Angeles 
(UCLA) after the Northridge, California, earthquake (near 
Los Angeles). Responses were collected 1 week after the 
disaster and then periodically for up to 16 months later. In 
contrast to Burger and Palmer, Helweg-Larsen found no 
evidence of unrealistic optimism—her participants rated 
their level of risk as com- parable with other 
undergraduates 1 week post-earthquake and over the next 
16 months. Helweg-Larsen also inquired about the 
participants’ experience of personal injury or dam- age 
caused by the Northridge earthquake or of anyone with 
whom they were well-acquainted. Both direct and indirect 
experiences were modestly associated with lower optimism, 
suggesting that physical proximity and experiences with the 
event tempered optimism about future invulnerability. These 
associations did not vary, however, as a function of time 
since the earthquake. People did not return to optimism; they 
were not optimistic at the start of the study. 
Fourth, research conducted by Weinstein, Lyon, Rothman, 
and Cuite (2000a, 2000b) is most relevant because they 
studied responses to tornado disasters. They inquired about 
perceived vulnerability to harm from a future tornado for 
residents of three communities struck by tornadoes and three 
matched, control communities. An inclusion criterion was 
that respondents in the three affected communities had not 
incurred any damage or injury in the tornado. Participants 
were interviewed about 2 to 4 weeks after the disaster. 
Although the residents of affected towns were less optimistic 
than the controls, they still reported their personal risk was 
lower than other peoples’. Fourteen months later, the 
researchers interviewed the residents of the three affected 
communities again. Although comparative risk at follow-
up was not reported (Weinstein et al., 2000b), Helweg-
Larsen (1999) cites a personal communication from 
Weinstein (November 26, 1996) indicating there was no 
change 14 months later. In sum, residents’ optimism was 
affected by their physical proximity to the disaster—
residents of affected towns were less optimistic than 
residents of unaffected towns. However, the passage of 
time since the tornado had no effect, as the residents at 
both time points felt they were less likely to be harmed 
by a future earthquake than their peers. 
Fifth, one other study is indirectly relevant. Li et al. 
(2010) conducted a door-to-door survey with residents living 
in an area of China that experienced an earthquake 1 to 1.5 
months earlier and with residents of a non-disaster area 
(control community). Participants were asked to estimate 
their comparative risk with respect to catching a serious 
infectious disease (another negative event). Those in the 
devastated area were less optimistic than participants in the 
non-disaster area. However, those living in the disaster 
area still judged their risk to be lower than 70% of their 
peers. A second study collected surveys from two new 
samples of disaster area residents at 4 and 11 months 
post-earthquake and compared them with the ratings of 
the Study 1 participants who had been surveyed 4 to 6 
weeks after the earthquake. The sample tested 11 months 
later was more optimistic that they would not become ill 
than those surveyed at 4 to 6 weeks or 4 months. As in 
Burger and Palmer (1992), optimism rebounded although it 
should be kept in mind that optimism was assessed about 
future illness and not an earthquake. With that caveat, 
even those living in the disaster area perceived their risk 
to be lower than that of peers, as had Weinstein et al.’s 
(2000a) participants. 
To summarize, there is empirical inconsistency about the 
trajectory of comparative optimism and the effects of 
physical and temporal proximity to a disaster. The Polish 
students, who did not have direct physical experience with 
the nuclear event, felt vulnerable for a year after Chernobyl 
(perhaps for fear of delayed effects of the explosion). 
Students residing near the Loma Linda earthquake, who 
also had no direct physical experience with the earthquake, 
only felt vulnerable for a few months. Residents of three 
Midwestern towns dam- aged by tornadoes were less 
optimistic than residents of control communities but still 
thought they were at less comparative risk (vs. peers) and 
this belief persisted for more than a year. Students near the 
Prieta quake were less optimistic immediately afterward and 
remained so for more than 16 months. The difference in 
results reported by Helweg-Larsen (1999) and Burger and 
Palmer (1992), who studied responses to earthquakes, is 
striking. Helweg-Larsen suggested the difference could be 
attributed to the ambiguity of Burger and Palmer’s risk 
questions, which referred to harm from a “future disaster,” 
and not specifically about earthquakes. She argued that soon 
after the Loma Prieta, the students probably were still 
focused on the earthquake so their optimism was tempered 
in answering about comparative risk; months later, the 
earthquake was probably less salient so they may have 
focused on other disasters, such as storms or flood—leading 
to more optimism. Helweg-Larsen’s (1999) study was not 
vulnerable to this criticism because she restricted her surveys 
to risk of harm from a future earthquake. Li et al. (2010) 
found some indirect evidence that optimism increased with 
time, but even a few weeks after an earthquake, residents 
were optimistic about their own chances. The differences 
among the studies may be, in part, a consequence of the 
different ways in which vulnerability has been measured. A 
discussion of these measures and their conceptual 
implications follows. 
 
 
Measurement of Vulnerability 
Direct and Indirect Comparison Measures 
How researchers assess personal beliefs about 
invulnerability may be important for drawing conclusions. 
Dolinski et al. (1987) and Burger and Palmer’s (1992) 
respondents made separate risk estimates for self and 
peers. (The absolute rating for peers was subtracted from 
the absolute rating for self to obtain an indirect 
comparative index; hence, a negative score represented 
comparative optimism, a positive score represented 
comparative pessimism.) Helweg-Larsen (1999) and Li et 
al. (2010) had participants make a direct comparison (i.e., 
“less than others” to “greater than others”). Weinstein et 
al. (2000a) requested participants to make a direct 
comparative rating and absolute ratings (“almost zero” to 
“very high”) for personal risk and other risk. Direct and 
indirect comparisons are sometimes treated as equivalent, 
but this may not be the case because they engage 
different judgment processes (Chambers & Windschitl, 
2004; Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; Klein 
& Zajac, 2009; Ranby, Aiken, Gerend, & Erchull, 2010; 
Rose, Suls, & Windschitl, 2011). Some researchers (Otten 
& Van der Pligt, 1996) consider the indirect comparison 
index to be a more accurate representation of people’s true 
beliefs because concerns about self-presentation should be 
less salient. Reporting that one is at less risk than others on 
a direct measure may appear self-aggrandizing; making 
separate judgments for self and others allows respondents to 
feel more comfortable about giving themselves favorable 
status. This is consistent with a trend for indirect 
comparison measures to show more consistent evidence for 
unrealistic optimism (i.e., the self is less at risk) than direct 
comparison (Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Kruger 
& Burrus, 2004; Rose, Endo, Windschitl, & Suls, 2008; for 
reviews, see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Helweg-Larsen 
& Shepperd, 2001). However, the use of direct versus 
indirect measures cannot fully account for differences in 
unrealistic optimism described in the preceding studies. 
Burger and Palmer found a return to optimism with an 
indirect measure; Weinstein et al. did not find a rebound 
(but, keep in mind, even the residents of the affected 
communities leaned toward optimism). 
 
Response Scales and Numerical Likelihood. Perceived 
vulnerability has been operationalized in several ways, 
which may tap into different ways people think about their 
risk. Traditionally, optimism has been measured with 
verbal rating scales, but vulnerability also may be 
assessed with numeric scales (i.e., 0%-100% likely) that 
avoid the ambiguity and subjective meaning associated 
with verbal labels and are not comparative. Another option 
is that people can be instructed to respond to numeric scales 
in terms of statistical probability or “gut/hunch” estimates 
(Windschitl & Wells, 1996). The former instructions prompt 
respondents to make judgments 
from a “statistical or scientific” perspective, which may 
engage deliberative, rule-based thinking. In contrast, 
instructions to rely on “gut feelings,” tend to engage 
associationistic, intuitive-based thinking (Sloman, 1996). 
Responding to verbal (vs. numerical) scales also is more 
likely to tap into intuitive thinking (Windschitl & Wells, 
1996). In those cases, when people believe their 
predictions are somewhat arbitrary, they guess 
optimistically, that is, in a way that suggests things will turn 
out all right. This is most likely when they judge based on 
their “gut feelings” (Windschitl, Smith, Rose, 
& Krizan, 2010). 
 
Current Research 
The preceding review suggests that the trajectory of 
perceived invulnerability may differ depending on whether 
beliefs are assessed with verbal versus numeric scales and 
whether absolute versus comparative vulnerability is the 
focus. Responses to verbal and intuitive/gut measures may 
encourage optimistic thinking because they are more 
susceptible to subjective appraisal, whereas statistical 
measures might facilitate a more evenhanded perspective. 
Moreover, as time passes and experience with the prior 
disaster is less salient, verbal and “gut-level” judgments 
about future risk may encourage a return to or maintenance 
of an optimistic outlook; statistical-level measures may 
force the individual to make estimates more grounded in 
reality. Based on prior evidence, it is also predicted that 
optimism should be more likely found on indirect than on 
direct comparative ratings of vulnerability. Whether verbal 
direct comparative, absolute, and indirect comparative 
vulnerability differ in their temporal trajectories since the 
disaster was an empirical question. 
The current research had two primary aims: (a) to study 
how different operationalizations of vulnerability may be 
associated with different trends as the time since the tornado 
passed and (b) to systematically examine the roles of 
physical and temporal proximity to a tornado disaster on 
judgments of future vulnerability. Several different 
measures of perceived vulnerability were collected. In 
Study 1, student participants estimated their perceived 
vulnerability at 1 and 6 months post-tornado disaster. 
The main variables were verbal scales about comparative 
and absolute vulnerability. Study 2 represented a 
replication and extension with com- munity residents, 
who were recruited via random-digit dialing at 6 and 12 
months post-tornado. Besides verbal scales, similar to 
those used in Study 1, numerical likelihood estimates were 
added to the Study 2 protocol. Study 3 involved door-to-
door recruitment of community residents, who lived in 
affected versus unaffected areas of the city—surveyed at 6 
and 12 months post-tornado. As in Study 2, the neighbor- 
hood surveys included verbal scales concerning 
comparative and absolute vulnerability, as well as 
numerical likelihood estimates. 
 
 
Study 1 
Overview 
In April 2006, a F-2 tornado with winds speeds of 150 mph 
left a path of destruction 4.5 miles long and one third of a 
mile wide in the downtown area of a small city and home of 
a state university with a population of approximately 65,000 
permanent residents and 26,000 students. There were 
extensive injuries and damage, with estimates of damage 
of US$10 million to businesses, tens of millions to 
private residences and to the university (The Gazette 
Staff, 2006). One month later, undergraduates leaving two 
large classes at the end of lecture were recruited to 
complete surveys about their experiences with the tornado 
and beliefs about future tornado risk. Six months later, 
those who had agreed to be recontacted completed a 
follow-up survey. 
 
Method 
Participants. Students in one psychology and one nursing 
class at a large Midwestern university were recruited while 
leaving their classrooms. All participants were asked to fill 
out a paper-and-pencil survey concerning their reactions and 
experiences following the recent tornadoes. Time 1 responses 
(N = 269) were collected approximately 1 month post-
tornado. Of the original 269 participants, 48% (n = 129) 
expressed interest in being recontacted for a follow-up sur- 
vey and provided an email address. Six months after the 
initial survey (or 7 months post-tornado), they were 
contacted for a second (online) survey. Fifty-three 
percent (n = 68) completed the follow-up, which was the 
sample used in all of the main analyses. 
 
Dependent Measures 
Vulnerability beliefs. The survey at Times 1 and 2 requested 
three vulnerability estimates about harm from a future 
tornado. The direct index of comparative optimism 
inquired about how likely the participant would be injured 
in a tornado before age 50 compared with the average 
student (−3 = much less likely than the average student, +3 
= much more likely than the average student). There 
were also 2 items inquiring about absolute likelihood—an 
estimate for the self and an estimate for the average 
university student about the likelihood of being injured by a 
tornado before the age of 50 (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = 
extremely likely). The absolute peer rating was subtracted 
from the absolute self-rating to obtain an indirect 
comparative risk index (with negative scores indicating 
self at less risk and positive scores indicating self at greater 
risk). 
Tornado experiences. The Time 1 survey also inquired 
about experiences associated with the recent tornado that 
might affect beliefs in vulnerability. First, participants 
indicated the extent of personal damage caused by the 
tornado (0 = none, 4 = complete damage; for example, to 
roof, windows,  possessions,  carpeting,  automobile),  
which  were 
aggregated into an overall “damage index” (α = .72; M = 
.34, SD = 0.60). Second, participants were asked about 
injuries that resulted from the tornado (i.e., personal, 
family/ friend, saw someone injured, acquainted with 
someone who was injured), which were dummy-coded 
into two categories: had experience with self- or other 
injury (1) or not (0). Twenty-four percent of the final 
sample (n = 16) had or knew someone who was injured 
in the tornado. Third, participants indicated their physical 
proximity to the tornado when it touched down in terms 
of blocks or miles. These responses were later 
transformed into miles or fractions of a mile (e.g., 8 
blocks equal 1 mile; M = 2.28, SD = 6.05). Fourth, 
participants rated their fears about dying during the 
tornado (1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely; M = 2.10, SD = 1.59) 
as an additional indicator of their physical proximity to the 
tornado. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Attrition Analyses. Attrition analyses were conducted to assess 
whether the Time 2 sample (n = 68) differed from the larger 
sample that responded only at Time 1. Those who provided 
T1 data were comparable in age (M = 20.63, SD = 3.70) to 
participants who provided T1 and T2 data (M = 20.85, SD = 
2.66), t(262) = −.44, p > .60. The proportion of females also 
was comparable in both samples (71% vs. 74%), χ
2
(1, n = 
269) = .14, p > .10. The final sample consisted of 50 female 
and 18 male students. The vast majority of participants were 
Caucasian (59); 3 others identified themselves as Asian, 2 as 
Hispanic, and 4 did not provide information about ethnicity. 
Responses to the vulnerability estimates at Time 1 were 
compared between those who only completed the Time 1 
measures and those who also completed the follow-up. No 
significant differences were found (all ts < 1; ps > .10). In 
sum, the participants who only completed the initial survey 
did not differ from those participants completing both T1 
and T2 surveys, in terms of demographics or responses to 
the main dependent measures. The results reported below 
pertain only to those who responded to the Times 1 and 2 
surveys. 
 
Vulnerability Perceptions and Changes Over Time 
Direct comparative ratings. A major question was whether 
vulnerability perceptions shifted with time since the tornado 
(1-7 months) and whether the magnitude of mean-level 
change varied across different types of vulnerability 
measures. In terms of direct comparative risk, at Time 1 
(M = 
−.32, SD = .87) and Time 2 (M = −.19, SD = 1.20), 
participants were generally comparatively optimistic about 
invulnerability to future tornado injuries, as indicated by 
one-sample t tests comparing the mean values to the mid- 
point of the scale (“0”), t(67) = −3.06, p < .01 and t(67) = 
−1.89, p = .06. Although comparative optimism was some- 
what reduced at Time 2, the difference was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 67) = 1.43, p > .20 (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1. Mean-Level Shifts and Rank-Order Stability of 
Vulnerability Perceptions for Future Tornado Injury Across Time in 
Study 1 (n = 68). 
 
 
Time 1 Time 2 
   Correlation 
Experience With the Tornado and Vulnerability Estimates. 
Experience with injury (self or acquaintance) was positively 
correlated with estimated vulnerability of others at Times 
1 (r = 
.25) and 2 (r = .23; see Table 2). Damage from the tornado 
was unrelated to vulnerability estimates. Closer proximity to 
 
Variable M SD M SD (Times 1 and 2) the tornado was negatively related to unrealistic comparative 
Direct 
comparative 
−0.32*** 0.87 −0.19* 1.20 .43*** optimism at Time 2: One was less optimistic the closer one 
had been to the places where the tornado touched down 
Absolute self 1.71 1.25 1.41 1.28 .43** (−.30, p < .05). The trend was similar at Time 1 but nonsig- 
Absolute other 2.04 1.19 1.91 1.32 .28** nificant. Other people were judged to be more vulnerable the 
Indirect −0.36** 1.20 −0.49*** 0.84 
.20 
closer the participant had been to the tornado’s touchdown 
comparative 
 
 
Note: Direct comparative estimates were made on 7-point scales (−3 = much less 
likely than the average student, +3 = much more likely than the average student).Absolute 
estimates were made on 7-point scales (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely). 
Means in the “indirect comparison” row were computed by subtracting absolute 
other estimates from absolute self-estimates.Values in the direct and indirect com- 
parison rows that significantly differ from “0” are marked with asterisks 
(*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01). 
 
 
 
Absolute self and other ratings. For estimates of absolute 
personal vulnerability about future tornado injury, the mean 
was 1.71 (SD = 1.25) at Time 1 and 1.41 (SD = 1.28) at Time 
2, suggesting participants tended to report higher absolute 
risks immediately after the tornado, F(1, 67) = 3.22, p = .08. 
However, because the response scale ranged from 1 = 
extremely unlikely to 7 = extremely likely, absolute 
vulnerability for the self was very low 1 to 6 months 
following the tornado. The estimates for the average 
student were some- what higher: Time 1 M = 2.04 (SD = 
1.2) and Time 2 M = 1.91 (SD = 1.32), which did not differ, 
F(1, 66) = .53, p > .47. Comparison of the absolute 
estimates for the self versus the average student (i.e., 
indirect comparative index) indicated that respondents 
believed they were less likely to be injured in a future 
tornado than the average student at Time 1 (M = 
−.36, SD = 1.20), t(66) = −2.44, p < .02, and Time 2 (M = 
−.49, SD = .84), t(67) = −4.78, p < .01; these values did not 
differ, F(1, 66) = .69, p > .41. In summary, 1 month after the 
disaster, participants were quite optimistic that they would 
not suffer injury in a future tornado and they remained 
optimistic 6 months post-tornado. 
Rank-order stability. An alternative measure of belief 
vulnerability change, using correlational analyses, was 
computed as an index of whether the relative rankings of 
perceived vulnerability were consistent across time 
(Shepperd, Helweg-Larsen, & Ortega, 2003; Watson, 
2004).
1 
Shepperd et al. (2003) found considerable 
consistency for comparative vulnerability across a range of 
events. 
Rank-order stability was moderate across direct 
comparative estimates for tornado injury (see Table 1), but 
somewhat lower for absolute other risk estimates and the 
indirect comparative index. The greater instability of 
absolute other and indirect measures may stem from the 
difficulties in making judgments about the “average” 
person, for whom one has less information (Moore, 2007; 
Rose, 2010; Windschitl, Rose, Stalkfleet, & Smith, 2008). 
(r = .26, p < .05), but only at Time 1. The closer to the 
disaster at Time 1, the more vulnerable participants felt 
on the indirect comparative index (r = −.25, p < .05). Fear 
of dying at Time 1 was most consistently related to higher 
vulnerability across all indicators, but only the direct 
comparative and absolute self-ratings were statistically 
significant by conventional standards, rs = .25 and .29, ps < 
.05. Regression analysis were also conducted using Time 
1 variables to predict Time 2 variables, but these results 
were uniformly weak and nonsignificant. 
 
Study 2 
College students were comparatively optimistic about 
future injury from tornados, but perhaps they anticipated 
relocating after graduation to another area of the country 
where tornadoes are rare. In Study 2, relatively permanent 
residents of the small Midwestern city, where the tornado 
touched down and of an adjoining community, were 
contacted via random-digit dialing and asked to answer a 
short survey regarding the recent tornadoes. The 
questions were virtually identical to those used in Study 
1, with the exception of adding numeric vulnerability 
measures (on 0%-100% scales) with instructions to 
make gut-level and statistical-level probability estimates. 
The inclusion of direct comparative, absolute verbal, and 
absolute numeric scales was expected to produce a more 
complete picture of whether changes in optimism differ 
depending on the type of risk judgment. 
 
Method 
Recruiting and Participants. A call center affiliated with a state 
university recruited community residents of the small city 
and an adjoining community. Six months after the tornadoes, 
a commercially available random-digit dialing list of 
residents was used by nine different professional 
interviewers who made a total of 2,183 calls. Each number 
was attempted at least 10 times if it was a working 
number. Of these, 756 were nonworking numbers, for 640 
calls no one could be reached, 320 of those who 
answered declined to be inter- viewed, 129 were 
businesses and therefore not relevant, 65 people answered 
who were ineligible (i.e., minors), and 21 did not speak or 
understand English. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations Between Tornado Experiences and Vulnerability Perceptions in Study 1. 
 
 
Injuries Damage Proximity Fears of dying 
 
Variable Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2 
Direct −.01 −.04  −.17 −.00  −.19 −.30**  .29** .13 
Absolute self .16 .15  .12 .06  .01 −.03  .25** .19 
Absolute other .25** .23*  −.04 .12  .26** .05  .22* −.05 
Indirect −.07 −.14  .17 −.11  −.25** −.13  .24* .12 
Note: For the analyses involving “injuries” to self or others (0 = no, 1 = yes), the “damage” index (0 = none, 4 = complete damage), and “fears of dying” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = absolutely), positive correlations indicate that more tornado-related experiences were associated with greater perceived vulnerability. For 
“proximity” to the path of the tornado (in blocks), high negative correlations indicate that participants closer to the tornado reported more vulnerability. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. 
 
 
A total of 252 community residents completed Time 1 
interviews about “Perceptions of negative life events.” All 
respondents were re-contacted 1 year after the tornado. 
Eighty-five percent (n = 213) of the original participants 
completed the Time 2 interview. 
 
Dependent Measures 
Vulnerability perceptions. Participants answered five 
different vulnerability questions at Times 1 and 2. 
Respondents were asked a direct comparative question: 
How likely he/she was to be injured by a tornado in the next 
10 years, compared with the average Iowan (−2 = much less 
likely than the average Iowan to +2 = much more likely than 
the average Iowan). Respondents were asked two separate 
questions to assess absolute verbal estimates: How likely 
he/she and the average Iowan were to be injured by a 
tornado in the next 10 years (1 = extremely unlikely, 5 = 
extremely likely). Finally, these were followed by 2 items 
requesting absolute estimates made on numeric scales: 
How likely from a “statistical or scientific point of view” 
they would be to experience a tornado injury in the next 10 
years and from a “personal or gut- level point of view” (0%-
100% likely). 
Tornado experiences. As in Study 1, respondents were 
queried at Time 1 about property damage (0 = none, 4 = 
complete damage) to roof, windows, possessions, carpeting, 
and car (α = .80; mean across the 5 items = 1.18, SD = .49), 
injury to self and others (coded as 1 if “yes;” 12%, n = 26; 0 
if none, 88%, n = 187), to what degree they thought they 
might die in the tornado (1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely; M 
= 1.35, SD = 1.00), and their physical proximity to the 
tornado (in miles) when it touched down (M = 4.35, SD = 
15.79). 
Demographic information. With the exception of age 
(participants had to be at least 18 years of age to participate so 
this was asked initially), all demographics were collected 
after all of the other questions. Interviewers inquired about 
(a) years residing in the small city and adjoining 
community, (b) years residing in the same location, (c) 
ethnicity, (d) type of housing (i.e., apartment, house), (e) 
any children under 18 living in the residence, (f) marital 
status (i.e., married, divorced, widowed; marriage-like 
relationship), and (g) job status (i.e., employed [part- or full-
time], retired, unemployed). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Attrition Analyses. Demographic information for the Time 1 
sample and those who also were re-interviewed at Time 2 
are presented in Table 3. The subset of respondents who 
participated only at Time 1 did not differ in age (M = 
48.8; SD = 13.62) from those who also completed the 
second interview (M = 52.38; SD = 15.37), t (243) = –1.3, 
p = .20. There was 
no difference in the proportion of women who participated in 
the follow-up (65.7%) versus only at Time 1 (61.5%), chi- 
square (1, n = 252) = .255, p = .61. Finally, with the 
exception of the direct comparative estimates, Time 1 
responses to vulnerability measures for those who 
completed both inter- viewers did not differ from those 
who completed the first interview (ts < 1, ps > .10). The 
results described below are based on the 213 participants 
who were interviewed at both time points. 
 
Vulnerability Perceptions and Changes Over Time 
Direct comparative ratings. At Time 1 (M = −.67, SD = .87) 
and Time 2 (M = −.57, SD = .86), participants were more 
optimistic that they would avoid tornado injury in the future 
than the average Iowan, as indicated by one-sample t tests 
comparing the mean values to the midpoint of the scale 
(“0”), t(211) = −11.19, p < .01 and t(211) = −9.58, p < .01. 
There was a marginally significant difference between the 
Times 1 and 2 direct comparative indices, F(1, 210) = 3.02, 
p = .08 (see Table 4), with the sample reporting being slightly 
less optimistic a year later. 
Absolute self and other ratings. Consistent with the findings 
in Study 1, the absolute rating of personal risk at Time 2 
(M = 1.75, SD = 0.88) was lower than at Time 1 (M = 1.89, 
SD = 0.92), F(1, 211) = 4.29, p < .05. Recall that absolute 
risk was estimated on a 1- to 5-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 
5 = very likely), so personal risk was perceived to be lower as 
the tornado disaster faded from memory. Absolute risk esti- 
mates for “the average person” were higher than the self- 
estimates, but they did not differ across the two time points 
(Time 1 M = 2.03, SD = 0.98; Time 2 M = 1.99, SD = 0.95); 
F(1, 209) = .44, p > .10. On the indirect comparative index— 
calculated by subtracting the absolute other risk rating from 
 
 
Table 3. Demographics for Study 2. 
Time 1 
Full Sample 
(n = 252) 
 
 
M (SD) or 
 
 
Times 1 Time 2 
Responders 
(n = 213) 
 
 
M (SD) or 
Absolute numerical estimates. Likelihood estimates made 
from a “statistical or scientific” perspective did not differ 
between Time 1 (M = 13.34, SD = 18.03) and Time 2 (M = 
13.56, SD = 17.90), F(1, 209) = .03, p > .10; nor did esti- 
mates based on “personal/gut-level” perspective at Time 1 
Variable frequency% frequency% (M = 11.00, SD = 18.23) and Time 2 (M = 10.18, SD = 
17.37), F(1, 211) < 1, p >.10. The “statistical or scientific” 
Age 51.85 (15.15) 52.38 (15.38) 
Gender 
Male 88 (35%) 73 (34.3) 
estimates were, however, higher than those based on “gut- 
level/personal” estimates at Time 1, t(211) = 2.49, p < .02, 
Female 
Ethnicity 
164 (65%) 140 (65.7) and Time 2, t(210) = 5.67, p < .01. On average, residents 
thought there was a little more than a 1-in-10 chance they 
Asian American 4 (1.6%) 3 (2.4%) would be harmed by a future tornado. This is an overesti- 
African American 6 (2.4%) 6 (2.9%) mate based on data from the National Severe Storms Labo- 
Caucasian 217 (87.2%) 184 (87.6%) ratory (2008) that the probability of a tornado striking the 
Hispanic 6 (2.4%) 
2 (1.0%) 
respondent’s area in a given year is less than 1%: “Since 
Native American 5 (2.0%) 5 (2.3%) 
Other 11 (4.4%) 10 (4.8%) 1980, there have been 729 injuries and 26 deaths attribut- 
Marital status 
Married 
In a relationship 
Never married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Children below 18 
Yes 75 (29.8%) 62 (29.1%) 
No 177 (70.2%) 151 (70.9%) 
Employment status 
able to tornadoes.” (http://www.crh.noaa/images/dmx/dmx/ 
IowaToClimatologyFinal-2008.pdf). Discussion of the 
apparent overestimation of risk will be considered 
following the presentation of Study 3’s results. 
Rank-order stability. For comparative and absolute self- 
risk, rank-order stabilities across Times 1 and 2 were of 
moderate magnitude (see Table 4). For absolute other risk, 
stability tended to be higher than in Study 1; stability of 
statistical- and gut-level estimates were moderate in size. 
Employed (full or 
part) 
165 (65.5%) 135 (63.4%)  
Did Experience With the Tornado Influence Vulnerability? Having 
Unemployed 27 (10.7%) 22 (10.3%) 
Retired 60 (23.8%) 56 (26.3%) 
Residence type 
House 198 (78.6%) 171 (80.2%) 
Apartment 23 (9.1%) 18 (8.5%) 
Other 31 (12.3%) 24 (11.3%) 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mean-Level Shifts and Rank-Order Stability of 
Vulnerability Perceptions Across Time in Study 2 (n = 212). 
experienced injury or damage or knowing someone who did 
were unrelated to vulnerability judgments (see Table 5). 
Proximity/injury to the tornado was modestly correlated 
with some of the vulnerability indices in Study 1, but there 
were no appreciable or significant correlations in the tele- 
phone sample. However, fear about dying showed more 
associations with future vulnerability, especially with gut- 
level and statistical assessments of likelihood. 
 
 
Time 1 Time 2 
   Correlation 
Variable 
 
 
M SD M SD (Times 1 and 2) Study 3 
Direct 
comparative 
 
 
 
comparative 
Statistical 
probability 
−0.67*** 0.87 −0.57*** 0.86 .45*** 
 
 
 
 
 
13.34 18.03 13.56 17.90 .44*** 
Both college students (Study 1) and community residents 
(Study 2) seemed confirmed in their beliefs about 
comparative invulnerability to a future tornado. These 
beliefs shifted little with time since the disaster, but the 
nature of the experience (e.g., fear of dying) with the 
tornado moderated vulnerability. In Study 3, we tried to 
directly assess the role of tornado impact/experience on the 
trajectory of optimism. 
Gut probability 11.00 18.23 10.18 17.37 .48*** 
 
 
Notes: Rows 1 to 4 are explained in Table 1. Probability estimates were made on 
101-point scales (0%-100% likely). 
**p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
the  absolute  self-rating—personal  risk  was  judged  to  be 
lower than for the average peer at Time 1 (M = −.14, SD = 
.98), t(211) = −2.04, p < .05, and Time 2 (M = −.25, SD = 
.84), t(210) = −4.28, p < .01; these values did not differ, 
F(1, 209) = 2.48, p > .10. 
Our expectation was that living in close proximity to and 
regularly seeing the damage left by the tornadoes should 
increase beliefs about vulnerability. To test this idea, com- 
munity residents were surveyed in areas of the city that had 
been in the path of the tornadoes and incurred damage and 
in comparable areas that had been unaffected. Although 
some neighborhoods partly recovered within a few months, 
there was still much damage to buildings, trees, and other 
vegetation clearly evident more than 16 months after the 
tornado. 
Absolute self 1.89 0.92 1.75 0.88 .43*** 
Absolute other 2.03 0.98 1.99 0.95 .53** 
Indirect −0.14** 0.98 −0.25*** 0.84 .34** 
 
155 (61.5%) 133 (62.4%) 
16 (6.4%) 13 (6.1%) 
24 (9.5%) 20 (9.4%) 
35 (13.9%) 29 (13.6%) 
22 (8.7%) 18 (8.5%) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Zero-Order Correlations Between Tornado Experiences and Vulnerability Perceptions in Study 2. 
 
 
Injuries Damage Proximity Fears of dying 
 
Variable Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2  Time 1 Time 2 
Direct −.04 −.04  .07 .12*  .09 .04  .12* .14** 
Absolute self .03 .07  .11* .07  −.03 −.10*  .12* .24*** 
Absolute other .03 .04  .05 −.05  −.10 −.12*  .22*** .21*** 
Indirect −.01 .02  .06 .14**  .08 .01  −.10 .02 
Gut level −.10 −.07  .05 −.07  −.03 −.04  .26*** .37*** 
Stat level −.12 −.03  .07 −.05  −.04 −.02  .19*** .29*** 
Note: For the analyses involving “injuries” to self or others (0 = no, 1 = yes), the “damage” index (0 = none, 4 = complete damage), and “fears of dying” (1 = not 
at all, 7 = absolutely), positive correlations indicate that more tornado-related experiences were associated with greater perceived vulnerability. For 
“proximity” to the path of the tornado (in blocks), high negative correlations indicate that participants closer to the tornado reported more vulnerability. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Procedure. Neighborhoods were chosen that 
had been in the tornadoes’ paths versus comparable areas that 
had not by referring to detailed maps of the tornado path 
(found at www.ic.gov.org) and matched to population tracts 
within the community based on the 2000 U.S. Census (http:// 
www.census.gov/). Using these selection criteria, we 
identified tornado-affected and non-affected areas of the city, 
which matched on population size (average number of 
people across selected tracts was 3,878 vs. 3,214), median 
income (average median income across selected tracts 
was US$55,672 vs. US$56,374), and demographics (e.g., 
percentage of minority citizens across selected tracts was 
7.51% vs. 7.53%). 
Approximately 6 months after the tornado, a team of 
research assistants went door-to-door in the selected 
neighborhoods to recruit participants for a study about 
“reactions to the tornadoes in April 2006.” Participants 
were offered US$10 gift cards good at local shops as 
reimbursement; only one person per household was 
permitted to participate. Once someone agreed, research 
assistants left the questionnaire with them to complete 
while the assistants continued on to new houses. 
Approximately 15 to 25 min later, research assistants 
returned to pick up the completed questionnaire packet 
and to give participants a gift certificate. A total of 210 
residences were approached. In all, 122 nonstudent com- 
munity residents agreed and completed Time 1 surveys 
(58%). Six months later, participants were sent a follow-up 
questionnaire in the mail and were further prompted via 
email and/or phone to encourage survey completion. Those 
participants who returned Time 2 questionnaires via mail 
were sent an additional gift card. Fifty-four (or 44%) of the 
original participants completed surveys at Time 2. The 
results reported below are based on a sample size of 54, with 
20 from affected and 34 from non-affected areas. 
 
Dependent Measures 
Vulnerability perceptions. Study 3 used the same direct 
comparative, absolute self (verbal), absolute other (verbal), 
 
absolute (numerical) “personal or gut-level,” and absolute 
(numerical) “statistical or scientific” items as Study 2. These 
were queried at Times 1 and 2. 
Tornado experiences. The Time 1 survey also included the 
same measures of “tornado experience” used in Study 2: 
questions about damage, injury to self and/or others, anxiety 
about dying during the tornado, and proximity to the 
tornadoes (in miles) when they struck. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Attrition Analyses. Participants who only completed surveys at 
Time 1 were comparable in age (M = 52.69, SD = 17.8) with 
those who completed Times 1 and 2 measures (M = 51.04, 
SD = 15.37), t(119) = . 60, p > .10. A higher proportion of 
females tended to complete surveys at Times 1 and 2 (74%) 
than at Time 1 (58% female), χ
2
(1, n = 122) = 3.20, p = .07). 
Time 1 responses to the vulnerability measures did not differ 
between those who completed both surveys versus those 
who completed only the first (ts < 1.70, ps > .09). The results 
described below are based on participants who completed 
both surveys. 
 
Experiences Across Affected Versus Affected Areas. The tornado 
experience variables (e.g., injury and anxiety about dying) 
were analyzed to validate our classification of affected and 
unaffected neighborhoods. Residents of affected areas 
reported a higher level of damage (M = .83, SD = .94) than 
those living in non-affected areas (M = .08, SD = 
.30), t(52) = 4.36, p < .01. In addition, knowing someone 
or personally being injured was more common in affected 
(21%) than in non-affected areas (6%), χ
2
(1, n = 52) = 2.66, 
p = .10. Third, participants residing in affected areas 
recalled having experienced more anxiety about dying 
during the tornado (M = 2.10, SD = 1.59) than participants 
in non-affected areas (M = 1.39, SD = 0.83), t(51) = 2.12, 
p < .04. Fourth, 
participants living in affected neighborhoods reported 
being somewhat closer to the tornado (in miles) when it 
touched down (M = 0.93, SD = 2.63) than did participants 
 
 
Table 6. Mean-Level Shifts and Rank-Order Stability of Vulnerability Perceptions As a Function of Area and Time in Study 3. 
 
 
Affected areas (n = 20) Non-affected areas (n = 34) 
 
 Time 1  Time 2   Time 1  Time 2 
Variable M (SD)  M (SD) r  M (SD)  M (SD) r 
Direct comparison −1.00*** (1.30)  −0.40*** (0.88) .14  −0.58*** (1.25)  −0.70*** (1.18) .45*** 
Absolute self 2.33 (1.37)  2.22 (1.22) .34  2.15 (1.25)  2.32 (1.22) .58*** 
Absolute other 2.83 (1.46)  2.85 (1.40) .34  2.38 (1.41)  2.85 (1.46) .48*** 
Indirect comparison −0.50*** (0.71)  −0.67*** (0.97) .00  −0.24** (0.61)  −0.53*** (1.33) .48*** 
Stat probability 13.50 (19.38)  14.73 (17.01) .40  14.95 (14.70)  22.64 (17.14) .80*** 
Gut probability 7.80 (16.54)  15.88 (23.31) .66***  12.82 (10.45)  10.45 (15.19) .62*** 
Note: Direct comparative estimates were made on 5-point scales (−2 = much less likely than the average Iowan, +2 = much more likely than the average Io- 
wan).Absolute estimates were made on 5-point scales (1 = extremely unlikely, 5 = extremely likely). Means in the “indirect comparison” column were created 
by subtracting absolute other estimates from absolute self-estimates.Values in the direct and indirect comparison columns that significantly differ from   
“0” indicated with asterisk (**p < .05. ***p < .01). Probability estimates were made on 101-point scales (0%-100% likely).Values in the “r” columns are the 
correlations between Times 1 and 2 responses (**p < .05. ***p < .01). 
 
 
 
in non-affected neighborhoods (M = 1.53, SD = 1.79), 
although this difference did not approach statistical 
significance, t(41) = −.89, p > .10. In general, however, the 
affected versus unaffected classification of neighborhoods 
appeared to be valid. 
 
Vulnerability Perceptions and Changes Over Time 
Direct comparative ratings. Estimates for each type of 
vulnerability index were submitted to 2 (time) × 2 
(affected/ non-affected areas) mixed ANOVAs, with time 
treated as a within-participant factor. All means and SDs are 
displayed in Table 6. For direct comparisons, no significant 
main effects for time, F(1, 51) = 2.78, p = .10, nor area, 
F(1, 51) = .83, p > .10, were evident, but there was a 
significant interaction, F(1, 51) = 6.31, p < .02. Residents of 
affected neighborhoods were more comparatively 
optimistic at Time 1 (M = −1.00, SD = 1.30) than at Time 2 
(M = −.40, SD = .88), t(19) = 1.83, 
p < .08. However, residents of non-affected areas were 
comparably optimistic at Time 1 (M = −.58, SD = 1.25) and 
Time 2 (M = −.70, SD = 1.18), t(32) = 1.16, p > .10. Those 
living 
in a visibly damaged area were less optimistic 12 months 
later, whereas residents of non-affected areas showed no 
appreciable change. Notably, residents in both types of 
neighborhoods believed they were less vulnerable to a future 
tornado than were others at both time points; all four means 
were significantly different from the midpoint of the scale 
(all ts > 2, ps ≤ .05). 
Absolute (verbal) ratings. For absolute self (verbal) 
estimates, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions (all Fs < .60, ps > .40). Participants in 
affected and non-affected areas made very low 
vulnerability estimates about future tornado injury at 
Time 1 (M = 2.33, SD = 1.37 and M = 2.15, SD = 1.25 
for affected and unaffected areas, respectively) and Time 
2 (M = 2.22, SD = 1.22 and M = 2.32, SD = 1.22 for 
affected and nonaffected areas, respectively). Absolute 
other (verbal) estimates of vulnerability showed no 
 
significant main or interaction effects (all Fs < 1.50, ps > 
.20). Residents rated the average person’s risk as low at Time 
1 (M = 2.83, SD = 1.46 and M = 2.38, SD = 1.41 for affected 
and non-affected areas, respectively) and Time 2 (M = 
2.85, SD = 1.40 and M = 2.85, SD = 1.46 for affected and 
non-affected areas, respectively). For the indirect 
comparative estimates (absolute self-rating minus absolute 
other rating), negative scores indicate that participants 
perceived them- selves to be at lower risk than the 
average person: participants in affected areas at Time 1 
(M = −.50, SD = .71), t(17) = −3.00, p < .01, and at Time 
2 (M = −.67, SD = .97), 
t(19) = −3.12, p < .01, and for participants in nonaffected 
areas at Time 1 (M = −.24, SD = .61), t(33) = −2.26, p < .05, 
and Time 2 (M = −.53, SD = 1.33), t(33) = −2.32, p < .05. 
Numerical estimates. Estimates of numerical likelihood 
based on “gut-level” or “statistical” perspectives were sub- 
mitted to a 2 (Time) × 2 (judgment type: gut vs. statistical) × 
2 (affected/nonaffected neighborhood) mixed ANOVA, with 
the first two as within-participant factors. There was a 
significant main effect of judgment type, F(1, 50) = 4.95, 
p < 
.03, whereby estimates of likelihood were higher when 
judging risk from a “statistical or scientific” perspective 
(M = 14.10, SD = 17.02) than from a “personal or gut-
level” perspective (M = 11.45, SD = 16.29). There were no 
other main effects or two-way interactions (Fs < 2.85, ps > 
.10). How- ever, there was a significant three-way 
interaction, F(1, 51) 
= 6.43, p < .01. To dissect the interaction, separate analyses 
were conducted for the two judgment types. 
For estimates made from a “statistical or scientific” per- 
spective, there were no main or interaction effects for time or 
area (Fs < 1, ps > .10). Residents of affected areas estimated 
their risk at 13.5% (SD = 19.38) at Time 1 and 14.73% (SD = 
17.01) at Time 2. Estimates of residents of unaffected areas 
were comparable, 14.95% (SD = 22.64) at Time 1 and 14.70% 
(SD = 17.14) at Time 2. “Personal or gut-level” estimates also 
showed no effects of time or area (Fs < 2, ps > .10), but there 
 
 
was a significant Time × Area interaction, F(1, 51) = 5.73, p 
< .05. The nature of the interaction was the same one found 
for direct comparative vulnerability. At Time 1, residents of 
affected areas made lower gut-level estimates about future 
tornado injury at Time 1 (M = 7.80%, SD = 16.54) but higher 
estimates at Time 2 (M = 15.88%, SD = 23.31), F(1, 19) = 
4.72, p < .05. However, residents of non-affected areas 
pro- vided generally similar estimates at both Time 1 (M = 
12.82%, SD = 10.45) and Time 2 (M = 10.45%, SD = 
15.19), F(1, 32) 
= .94, p > .10. Thus, while persons living in areas where the 
tornado inflicted damage tended to become somewhat less 
optimistic over time, residents of non-affected areas felt 
about the same over the course of the year. Overall, as in 
Study 2, participants overestimated the numerical likelihood 
of future tornado injury by 8% to 16% relative to expert 
calculations (National Severe Storm Laboratory, 2008). 
Rank-order stability. Generally, stability was lower among 
the residents of affected areas (see Table 6). For direct 
comparative ratings, rank-order stability was moderate for 
those living in non-affected areas but appreciably lower for 
residents of affected areas. Rank-order stability for the 
absolute (verbal) self-ratings was higher among the residents 
of unaffected areas than those from affected areas, as was 
true of the absolute (verbal) other ratings for non-affected 
and affected. The largest difference in stability was for the 
indirect comparative index for unaffected versus and 
affected neighborhoods. Numerical “statistical” estimates 
of vulnerability were very stable among the non-affected 
residents, but appreciably lower in the affected residents. For 
“gut-level” estimates, likelihood was high for unaffected and 
affected residents. 
 
General Discussion 
Despite having experienced a tornado disaster, students and 
community residents reported they were less likely than 
their peers to experience a future tornado injury in terms of 
direct and indirect comparative indices at 1 month, 6 
months, or 1 year after the disaster. Unrealistic comparative 
optimism was “alive and well,” even in a community that 
experienced a significant disaster. 
 
Relation to Extant Research on the Trajectory 
of Perceived Vulnerability 
The results are closest to Weinstein et al. (2000a, 2000b), who 
also assessed reactions to tornado. Although Burger and 
Palmer (1992) and Li et al. (2010) found short-lived 
pessimism after (earthquake) disaster, only Dolinska, 
Gromski, and Zawisza (1987; nuclear reactor accident) and 
Helweg-Larsen (1999; earthquake) found persistent 
pessimism. Even when differences in perceived 
vulnerability emerged in the present research, estimates 
always were in the optimistic range (e.g., Weinstein, 1980). 
Such optimism may bolster subjective well- being—but also 
might discourage emergency preparedness— an important 
question for future researchers. 
Why Dolinska et al. (1987) and Helweg-Larsen (1999) 
found persistent pessimism remains unclear, whereas we 
found considerable optimism. However, the severity, dam- 
age, and threat posed by nuclear disasters (e.g., radioactive 
debris can travel long distances, seep into the ground, 
contaminate vegetation, farm animals, and the water supply) 
and by earthquakes (e.g., which can create havoc over 
large areas) differ from tornadoes for which catastrophic 
injury and damage may only occur in the specific area 
where the tornado touched down. Future research is 
needed to assess whether optimism or pessimism are 
distinctively connected to specific types of disasters based 
on severity and the possible range over which damage can 
be sustained. 
Two results suggested changes in perceived vulnerability 
as time passed since the disaster. In the college and the com- 
munity telephone samples, absolute personal risk estimates 
became more optimistic, whereas comparative vulnerability 
remained the same. In addition, residents of affected 
neighborhoods, within 6 months of the disaster, reported 
feeling less comparatively vulnerable and made lower 
“gut-level” numerical estimates. Twelve months post-
tornado, however, their estimates were somewhat less 
optimistic and resembled those of residents of unaffected 
neighborhoods. 
The initial optimism of the people living in communities 
with daily reminders of the tornado seems counterintuitive. 
Perhaps, however, the “gambler’s fallacy” was operating 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974) with affected residents 
thinking “lightning doesn’t strike twice in the same place.” 
Or these residents may have been relieved they had “dodged 
a bullet.” Heightened defensiveness in the face of visible 
damage for an extended period also may have prompted 
evaluation of the future more positively (Rothman, Klein, & 
Weinstein, 1996). 
The initially lower perceived vulnerability of people in 
the affected neighborhoods (at Time 1) seems contradictory 
to the finding that anxiety, fear of death, and familiarity with 
damage or injury was associated with greater vulnerability. It 
may be important to distinguish between how people felt 
during the tornado event versus later thoughts and feelings 
(e.g., lightening doesn’t strike twice in the same place). In 
any case, support providers and emergency workers should 
be prepared to find more optimism among survivors, who 
experienced “a close call,” than might be expected on an 
intuitive basis. 
 
Statistical- Versus Gut-Based Numerical 
Estimates 
The numerical likelihood ratings are striking because the 
absolute likelihood of experiencing injury of a future 
tornado actually is very low (less than 1%) National 
Severe Storms Laboratory (2008). Although the likelihood 
estimates suggest risk was overestimated, these need to be 
considered in context. First, storm experts have access to 
information about the absolute frequencies of past tornadoes, 
 
 
but most laypeople do not. It is not uncommon, however, for 
people to make likelihood estimates that greatly exceed the 
actual risks (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischoff, Layman, & 
Combs, 1978; Windschitl, 2002). For example, respondents 
asked how many cigarette smokers out of a hundred will get 
lung cancer predict about 43 when actually the risk is 
between 5% and 10% (see Viscusi, 1990; see also Weinstein, 
1998). Likelihood estimates are flexibly used and 
interpreted because they are affected by affect and context 
(e.g., Slovic & Peters, 2006; Windschitl, 2002; Zikmund-
Fisher, Fagerlin, & Uber, 2010). People also have difficulty 
generating risk estimates in terms of percentages. For 
example, estimates of 50% are frequent, but further 
inquiry suggests some respondents mean “the outcome 
might or might not happen,” (p. 135) or are trying to 
communicate that “they don’t know” (Weinstein, 1998). In 
any case, a chance of 1 in 10 may seem small. Thus, 
respondents, strictly speaking, overestimated risk, based 
on expert calculations, but the likelihood of future 
injury from a tornado still may have seemed low to 
them. 
In addition, estimates made on a statistical basis were 
higher than gut-level basis, which is consistent with other 
research findings of people guessing more optimistically, 
particularly when judging on the basis of their “gut” 
(Windschitl et al., 2010). However, our results do not show 
that “statistical”-level thinking led to somewhat more accu- 
rate estimates as they were somewhat further from the 
experts’ tornado injury calculations. 
 
Limitations and Conclusion 
These results reinforce the need to distinguish among 
different measures of perceived vulnerability. Perceptions 
of absolute vulnerability became more optimistic as the 
tornado receded further in the past, whereas direct and 
indirect comparative estimates and numerical likelihood 
estimates showed little change over time. Rank-order 
stability of the direct comparative estimates and absolute 
self-estimates was higher than that for peers or indirect 
comparative estimates perhaps because of the difficulties 
assessing the vulnerability of unspecified peers (Moore, 
2007; Rose, 2010; Windschitl et al., 2008). 
Although the study methods permitted an assessment of 
possible changes in perceived vulnerability as a function of 
time after a tornado disaster, we lacked a measure of 
vulnerability prior to the tornado. There also was some 
attrition; however, comparison of baseline attributes with 
the final samples showed no substantive differences. 
It is surprising and somewhat comforting to find 
comparative optimism within months of a tornado disaster. 
People thought there was approximately a 10% chance 
they would be injured in a future tornado (an overestimate), 
but they also were confirmed in the belief that their risk 
was lower than that of other people. Although Hannah 
Miller, with whom we introduced this article, initially 
seemed like a special 
case, she appears to represent “the norm,” and a challenge to 
emergency preparedness. 
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Note 
1. Mean-level change and rank-order stability can be independent. 
With the passage of time, the samples might perceive them- 
selves to be at less risk in terms of mean levels, but rank-order 
stability could be high if people shift in similar increments and 
do not overlap. Alternatively, mean-level change could show no 
evidence of change, but rank-order stability might drop and 
indicate that people are changing their rankings. 
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